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I.

INTRODUCTION.
In their February 14, 2019, blog post, Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”), officially announced

their decision to withdraw from the HQ2 deal in Long Island City, Queens, New York.1 Amazon
established the HQ2 initiative as an endeavor to locate the most ideal location for a second
headquarters.2 Their efforts in publicly informing states about this endeavor, however, had much
to do with acquiring competitive tax incentive offers by the different cities and states under the
auspices of catalyzing their respective economies in return.3 In early November, after two years
of searching, Amazon announced their commitment to headquarter part of their second location in
the Long Island City Queens location. 4 This was due, in part, to the tax incentive arrangement
established between New York and Amazon.5 To simplify the terms of the HQ2 arrangement with
New York, Amazon would create over twenty-five thousand new jobs with an average
compensation of $150,000 over the course of 10 years.6 In return, the Ordinance of New York
would provide over $1.2 billion in tax credits and $505 million in upfront capital grants over the
same period of time through the Excelsior Investment Program. 7
Despite the proffered economic boon to be experienced by New York from the HQ2
proposal, Amazon’s decision to abandon the arrangement with New York after two years of
searching came after much obstruction, resentment, and trepidation by local forces. 8 To many,
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About Amazon, Update on plans for New York City headquarters (Feb. 14, 2019), AMAZON.COM,
https://blog.aboutamazon.com/company-news/update-on-plans-for-new-york-city-headquarters.
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including Senator Alexandria Ocasio Cortez, Amazon’s decision to drop out of the HQ2 deal was
a disaster averted.9 To others, including New York Mayor DeBlasio and Governor Cuomo, the
withdrawal of the HQ2 deal was a devastating political and practical defeat to New Yorkers. 10
Despite the political bruhaha that followed both Amazon’s HQ2 announcement of and
withdrawal from their decision to headquarter in Queens, there was a dearth of public dialogue
regarding the constitutionality in offering such state tax incentive measures in the first place.
Virtually all of the several states offer some type of tax incentive programs that aim to influence
business locations decisions. New York’s tax incentive program is the Excelsior Investment
Program.11

The Excelsior Investment Program is a state-sponsored tax incentive program

incorporated by New York aimed at “encourag[ing] businesses to expand in and relocate to New
York.”12

The Amazon HQ2 proposal was the largest Excelsior Investment Program offer

established since its inception,13 purporting to add billions to New York’s economy.14 Virtually
every state within the United States incorporates similar tax incentive programs expressly aimed
at attracting business within the designated state. Given that the policies are created by states and
have the potential to impact interstate commerce, there may be Commerce Clause implications.
Accordingly, this Note will discuss the constitutionality in offering tax incentive programs under
the Commerce Clause.
This Note will first introduce the concept of tax incentive programs, including Business
Location Tax Incentives, and their effect on state economies. Next, this Note will introduce the

9

Id.
Id.
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EXCELSIOR JOBS PROGRAM, https://esd.ny.gov/excelsior-jobs-program. (last visited Apr. 30, 2019).
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Id.
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Empire State Dev., EXCELSIOR JOBS PROGRAM,
https://cdn.esd.ny.gov/businessprograms/data/excelsior/excelsiorjobsprogramoverview.pdf. (last visited Apr. 30,
2019).
14
Id.
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constitutional principles that are implicated by such tax incentive programs, particularly the
Commerce Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause. This Note will then analyze whether
Business Location Tax Incentives are constitutional under the applicable tests enunciated in
Commerce Clause case law. Finally, if BLTIs, as they currently stand, are found unconstitutional,
this Note will analyze the possibility of conforming BLTI policies to constitutional requirements.
II.

BACKGROUND.

Tax Incentive Programs and Business Location Tax Incentives.
Tax incentives are tax-policy measures implemented by states to “reduc[e] taxes for
businesses and individuals” in exchange for the performance of some “desirable economic,
aesthetic, [or] social” action.15 Essentially, tax incentive measures offer credits against otherwise
applicable tax obligations to individuals who satisfy certain requirements that are usually catered
towards public policy initiatives.16 The desirable actions that tax incentive programs aim to
promote can range from promoting social responsibility to enhancing economic activity of the
particular locality.17 No two tax incentive programs are alike, and “the methods employed by the
states offering tax incentives are varied and can differ within and among the taxes levied by other
states.”18 “Exclusions, abatements, deductions, deferrals, and credits are all common” features
within tax incentive programs.19
Beginning in the late 18th and early 19th century, tax incentives were increasingly offered
in an effort to encourage economic development within the offering state.20 These tax incentive
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Phil Rabinowitz, Using Tax Incentives to Support Community Health and Development,
https://ctb.ku.edu/en/table-of-contents/implement/changing-policies/tax-incentives/main.
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Id. (e.g., tax deductions for charitable contributions).
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Philip M. Tatarowicz, Federalism, the Commerce Clause, and Discriminatory State Tax Incentives: A Defense of
Unconditional Business Tax Incentives Limited to in-State Activities of the Taxpayer, 60 Tax Law. 835, 839 (2007).
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programs offered tax incentives as a means to attract or retain businesses to the offering State,
which would subsequently create “more local jobs, more tax revenue (leading to the possibility of
more funding for schools and services), [and] an injection of energy into the community.”21 For
purposes of this Note, such tax incentive programs will be referred to as Business Location Tax
Incentives (“BLTI”). BLTIs have become a means by which a state “compete[s] with other states
for limited investment dollars [to] foster its broader economic development goals.”22
BLTIs are a highly attractive way for municipalities and states to compete in the hunt for
big-business because “[p]olicymakers can fine-tune [the] incentive[]” agreement to achieve any
desired tax-related offer sought by interested businesses when creating the legislation.23 The
ability to customize the parameters behind BLTI programs renders them readily applicable in any
given incentive arrangement and allows states and localities to foster highly-competitive taxreducing instruments.24 Given their use as competitive devices, such tax incentives are usually
“limited to in-state activities” in order to reap the entire economic benefit. 25
States implement BLTIs by incorporating them within their respective tax legislation or
tax code.26 The implementation of BLTIs, similar to the implementation of any other tax policy,
lies well within the states’ authority to tax given the governmental structure of the United States.
The United States of America is considered a federation of States. 27 As a federation, “lawmaking

AND SUGARY DRINK TAXES (Oct. 2017), https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/StateUniformity-Sugary-Drink-Taxes-2017.pdf (discussing the shift in the American economy from primarily focusing
on agriculture to more commercial enterprise).
21
Id.
22
Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 839.
23
Rabinowitz, supra note 15.
24
Id.
25
Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 839 (“Little is gained by the states in their competition for limited resources if they
are required to offer uniform tax incentives, or a single state is required to provide the same tax benefit for activities
taking place within and without its borders.”)
26
See EXCELSIOR JOBS PROGRAM, https://esd.ny.gov/excelsior-jobs-program. (last visited Apr. 30, 2019).
27
WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 12, (10th ed. 2013).

is decentralized” among the numerous states, at least when federal questions are not concerned. 28
Under the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people.”29 Accordingly, state taxation is merely an extension of state
authority when not in contravention with the Constitution.30

As part of their lawmaking

sovereignty pertaining to their respective tax codes, states enjoy the “power to provide subsidies
to promote certain public policies.”31 The various tax incentive programs in effect today are
manifestations of state power to provide such subsidies.32
BLTIs and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
State BLTI policy, just as any other state law, must comport with the U.S. Constitution. 33
Of pertinence to the constitutionality of state tax policy, “the principle sources of federal
constitutional limits are the Commerce and Import-Export Clauses of Article 1, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.”34 Given the motive behind BLTI policy,
which is to garner a competitive advantage in attracting business activity over other states,
constitutional concerns potentially arise under the Commerce Clause. Many analysts argue that
the rise of BLTI competition has caused a second “war between the states.” 35 These analysts have
likened the rise of tax competition through BLTI implementation to the economic rivalry between

28
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U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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See Id.
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Tracy A. Kaye, The Gentle Art of Corporate Seduction: Tax Incentives in the United States and the European
Union, 57 U. Kan. L. Rev. 93, 94 (2008).
32
Id.
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WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 12, (10th ed. 2013).
34
Id.
35
James R. Rogers, State Tax Competition and Congressional Commerce Power: The Original Prudence of
Concurrent Taxing Authority, 7 Regent U. L. Rev. 103, 104-05 (1996).
29

states under the Articles of Confederation—a very influential factor in drafting the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.36
The Commerce Clause.
The Constitution of the United States, in clause 3, section 8 of Article 1, expressly grants
Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.”37 This section, known as the Commerce Clause, provides Congress
with the exclusive ability to regulate interstate commerce. The incorporation of the Commerce
Clause “was meant to quell commercial animosities among the states.”38
Initially, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution was not meant to afford
the Federal Government with a “congressional override” on State taxing decisions.39 Prior to the
enactment of the Constitution (and therefore, the enforcement of the Commerce Clause), and
during the enforcement of the Articles of Confederation, States had broad and undisturbed latitude
in enacting whatever tax policy they deemed fit. 40 At that time, however, states began to enforce
taxing measures, such as imports and exports, against their sister states, “resulting in threatened
trade wars and worse.”41 The free reign given to the states at the time nurtured an environment of
“vicious economic rivalry” among the states through discriminatory tax policies. 42 This unfettered
competition among the states “weak[ened] [the] national union” to a point where its existential
legitimacy was placed into question on numerous occasions. 43 After recognizing “that economic
rivalry between the states was a significant, if not primary, threat to union,” the drafters of the
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 117, (10th ed. 2013).
39
Rogers, supra note 35, at 124.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 125 (“From its beginning, the weak national union organized by the Articles of Confederation threatened to
dissolve into three or four separate, even hostile, geographical powers.”).
37

Constitution aimed to unify the nation by granting Congress the ability to regulate interstate
commerce.44 Thus, Congress, under the Commerce Clause, now has expansive powers to regulate
interstate commerce even if it interferes with state taxing sovereignty. 45
The Dormant Commerce Clause.
Congress has not, does not, and likely will not address all aspects of regulation regarding
interstate commerce. 46 Neither the Constitution nor the Commerce Clause itself “says [anything]
about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence of any action by Congress.” 47 The
Commerce Clause, however, does not only provide an affirmative grant of power to Congress. 48
Implicit within the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court of the United States has held, is the
limitation of states to interfere with interstate commerce. 49 Particularly, this “negative sweep” of
the Commerce Clause, referred to as the Dormant Commerce Clause, places an “implicit restriction
on the ability of states to regulate interstate commerce.” 50 It is a judicially interpreted extension
of the Commerce Clause that prohibits certain state regulation when Congress has not spoken. 51
Despite the dearth of Congressional input, the Dormant Commerce Clause also “puts it into the
power of the Court to place limits upon state authority.”52 This “judicially enforced barrier[] to
congressional regulation touch[es] even on essential attributes of ‘state sovereignty’ such as state
taxing powers.”53
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Rogers, supra note 35, at 105; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111(1942).
46
Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for
Business, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 406 (1996).
47
WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 30, (10th ed. 2013); See Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (“the bounds of these restraints appear nowhere in the words of the Commerce
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48
Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 854.
49
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 231-232, 239 (1824).
50
WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 117, (10th ed. 2013).
51
Enrich, supra note 46, at 406.
52
WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 117, (10th ed. 2013) (citing Felix Frankfurter, The
Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite 18-19 (Quadrangle Paperback ed. 1964).)
53
Rogers, supra note 35, at 105.
45

The courts have established, although considered by some to be tortuous, 54 a two tiered
analytical framework in analyzing potential state law violations of the Commerce Clause when
Congress has not directly spoken on the issue.55 Discriminatory laws motivated by “simple
economic protectionism” are subject to a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.”56 This test applies
when a state law “impose[s] commercial barriers or discriminate[s] against an article of commerce
by reason of its origin or destination out of State.”57 The discriminating characteristic of such a
state law can be found “on its face” or unveiled behind the Law’s purpose or effect. 58 Such laws
contravene the “principle that our economic unit is the Nation,” 59 because they “excite [state]
jealousies and retaliatory measures” that the Constitution was designed to prevent.60 Under the
virtually per se rule of invalidity, a state law can only be considered valid if it can be shown “that
the state has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose.”61
If, on the other hand, a state law advances a legitimate government interest—such as to
“safeguard the health and safety of its people”—while imposing “incidental burdens on interstate
commerce,” the Pike Balancing test applies. 62 Under the Pike Balancing test, such a state law
“will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits.”63 The analysis becomes a question of degree and the validity of the

Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 936 (“The search for a bright-line test for impermissible state discrimination against
interstate commerce is likely doomed to fail, as the tortured history of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence
suggests.”).
55
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
56
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
57
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390.
58
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575 (1997).
59
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623.
60
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390.
61
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
62
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
63
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
54

state law will “depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.” 64
Analysis of state tax policies under the Dormant Commerce Clause implements these same
standards.
The Complete Auto Transit Case and its Progeny.
Modern jurisprudence pertaining to the Dormant Commerce Clause oversight of state
taxing sovereignty was established in the Supreme Court case, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady.65 In Complete Auto, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld, against Commerce
Clause challenge, a Mississippi tax that applied to “the privilege of . . . doing business” within
Mississippi.66 In affirming the Supreme Court of Mississippi’s decision to uphold the Mississippi
tax, the Court chose to focus on the practical effect of a tax measure on interstate commerce instead
of “attaching constitutional significance to [] semantic difference[s]” based on wordplay and
draftsmanship.67 Thus, one central theme behind the holding in Complete Auto was that analysis
of state tax policy under the Commerce Clause “should focus on the ‘practical effect’ of the
challenged tax measure, and not merely on its formal phrasing or technical structure.”68
Interestingly, however, the primary significance of Complete Auto was not found in its
holding. In dicta, the Supreme Court established a four-part test that would later be used to
determine when a particular state tax violates the Commerce Clause. 69 This test, later referred to
as the Complete Auto test, will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the

64

Id.
430 U.S. 274 (1977).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 285.
68
Enrich, supra note 46, at 425.
69
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288-89 (“Accordingly, we now reject the rule of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
O'Connor, that a state tax on the ‘privilege of doing business' is per se unconstitutional when it is applied to
interstate commerce, and that case is overruled.”)
65

“tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly
apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the
services provided by the state.”70 After the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 1977, the
Complete Auto test has “emerged as the starting point for modern Commerce Clause analysis of
state taxes.”71
The Anti-Discrimination Prong of the Complete Auto Test.
The Complete Auto test “applies to all forms of state tax, user fee or other law that directly
or indirectly, partially or in total, impacts protected [interstate] commerce.”72 Arguably, the most
applicable challenge to State BLTI policies stem from the third prong of the Complete Auto test,
which looks to whether the tax discriminates against interstate commerce. 73

This anti-

discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test has been identified as “perhaps the most crucial
element of the Commerce Clause as applied to state taxation.”74 Thus, it is likely the most
appropriate avenue for opponents of tax incentive programs, such as the Excelsior Jobs Program,
to issue challenges because the effects of these tax incentive programs favor local economies.75
Essentially, under the anti-discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test, state tax
policies, such as BLTIs, must provide “equal treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers
similarly situated” when interstate commerce is implicated. 76 Although the premise of the antidiscrimination prong seems relatively straightforward, the parameters behind its enforcement has
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WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 117, (10th ed. 2013) (citing 430 U.S., at 279).
Id. at 131.
72
Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 857.
73
Kaye, supra note 31, at 128.
74
Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 863 (“In contrast to the antidiscrimination requirement, which is virtually not
qualified, the remaining restrictions on state taxation (substantial nexus, fair apportionment, and fair relation to
services provided by the state) grant the state greater leeway in designing taxing provisions. Moreover, the
substantial nexus, fair apportionment, and fairly related requirements are to some extent independently incorporated
by the Due Process clause.”)
75
Kaye, supra note 31, at 128.
76
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 728 (1981).
71

not been so clear-cut. Throughout the years, however, relevant case law has elaborated on the
anti-discrimination prong and has set forth two concrete standards that will be used to assess the
constitutionality of BLTIs under the anti-discrimination prong of the Commerce Clause. Under
these standards, a taxing measure will violate the Complete Auto test, and accordingly the
Commerce Clause, if it obstructs free trade or cultivates economic protectionism.
Standard 1: Free Trade Standard.
For purposes of this Note, the first standard enunciated under the anti-discrimination prong
will be referred to as the Free Trade standard.77 The Free Trade standard emphasizes the
importance in Commerce Clause jurisprudence of establishing and maintaining a “national free
market.”78 As eloquently stated by Justice Jackson, “every farmer and every craftsman shall be
encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation
[and] every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area of the Nation
to protect him from exploitation.”79

In nurturing this “certainty,” the Free Trade standard

guarantees the “‘right’ to engage in interstate trade free from restrictive state regulation.”80
In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,81 the Supreme Court of the United
States articulated that the Free Trade standard was a potential means by which state taxes could
violate the Commerce Clause. There, New York amended its securities transfer tax, which reduced
the tax burden on transfers by nonresidents and on transfers of large blocks of shares, but only if
the transfers were made on a New York exchange.82 Several stock exchanges located outside of
New York challenged the amended New York transfer tax as unconstitutional under the anti-

See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 469-70 (1992).
79
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
80
Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 470.
81
429 U.S. 318 (1977).
82
Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 318.
77
78

discrimination prong of the Commerce Clause. 83 The Supreme Court held that the amended New
York transfer tax was unconstitutional as it impermissibly discriminated against interstate
commerce.84
Ultimately, the Court reasoned that discriminatory treatment from the amended transfer tax
violated the Commerce Clause because it had the effect of obstructing free trade. 85 The Court
propounded on the fact that the “fundamental purpose of the [Commerce] Clause is to assure that
there be free trade among the several State[s].”86 Free trade was obstructed by the New York tax
because the tax diverted the “flow of securities . . . from the most economically efficient channels”
into New York.87

The Court cautioned that “[t]his diversion of interstate commerce and

diminution of free competition in securities sales are wholly inconsistent with the free trade
purpose of the Commerce Clause.”88 Thus, pursuant to the Court’s holding in Boston Stock
Exchange, the anti-discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test will be violated when a state
tax policy diverts economic activity from their most economically efficient channels, thereby
obstructing free trade.89
Standard 2: Economic Protectionism from Discriminatory Effects
For purposes of this Note, the other anti-discrimination prong standard enunciated by case
law will be referred to as the Economic Protectionism standard. The Supreme Court of the United
States has found state tax policies to violate the anti-discrimination prong of the Complete Auto
test when such policies proliferate protectionist or isolationist ideals between and against sister

83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. at 330 (noting that “[t]he extra tax burden on out-of-state sales created by s 270-a is not what the New York
Court of Appeals holds it out to be; it neither compensates for a like burden on in-state sales, nor neutralizes an
economic advantage previously enjoyed by the appellant Exchanges because of s 270.”)
86
Id. at 335.
87
Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977).
88
Id.
89
Id.
84

states.90 Such policies, which are designed to mandate a “preferred right of access, [to in-state
residents] over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within [state] borders,”91 cause
the “multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the free commerce anticipated by the
Constitution.”92
In Maryland v. Louisiana, 93 the Supreme Court elaborated on the Economic Protectionism
standard often used in Commerce Clause cases. There, a Louisiana “first-use” tax was challenged
under the anti-discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test because the Louisiana first-use tax
scheme offered tax exemptions to Louisiana consumers “but [] uniformly applie[d]” to out-of-state
consumers, effectively burdening interstate commerce. 94 The Court agreed that the Louisiana
first-use tax is unconstitutionally discriminatory against interstate commerce because it fostered
economic protectionism by “providing a direct commercial advantage to local business.”95
Essentially, the Louisianan taxing scheme violated the Commerce Clause because it favored local
business and local activities over out-of-state activities.96
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,97 the Supreme Court of the United States further
elaborated on the Economic Protectionism standard. There, the Court analyzed a Hawaii excise
tax that was challenged, in part, as unconstitutionally discriminatory under the Commerce Clause
because it offered tax exemptions to locally produced alcoholic beverages without offering such
incentives to out-of-state beverages.98 The taxing scheme was defended on the grounds that the
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New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982).
Id.
92
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 728 (1981).
93
451 U.S. 725 (1981).
94
Maryland, 451 U.S. at 725.
95
Id. at 728.
96
Id. at 728.
97
468 U.S. 263 (1984).
98
Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265.
91

exemptions did not constitute a substantial competitive threat to out-of-state alcoholic beverages,99
and that they were meant to promote the struggling liquor enterprises within Hawaii. 100
The Court held that the Hawaii excise liquor tax was unconstitutionally discriminatory
under the Commerce Clause because “it had both the purpose and effect of discriminating in favor
of local products,” therefore fostering economic protectionism. 101 The Court identified the Hawaii
excise tax as a protectionist tax because it was meant to bolster local economy by providing a
direct commercial advantage through lower tax burdens.102 This was sufficient for the Court to
incorporate the per se rule of invalidity and consequently invalidate the tax. 103
Pivotal to their holding, the Supreme Court analyzed the nuance behind protectionist taxes.
The Court first defined economic protectionism as legislation “imposed by a State operating to the
disadvantage of the products of other States when introduced into the first mentioned State.”104
Such legislation, the Court articulated, is “a regulation in restraint of commerce among the States,
and as such is a usurpation of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Congress of the
United States.”105 The Court then held that state taxing legislation will “constitute[] ‘economic
protectionism’ . . . on the basis of either discriminatory purpose, . . . or discriminatory effect.”106
Discriminatory effect was said to be found “as long as there is some competition between the
locally produced exempt products and non-exempt products from outside the State.”107 The Court
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Id. at 268.
Id. at 272.
101
Id. at 273.
102
Id. at 270.
103
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984).
104
Id. at 271 (citing Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455 (1886).).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 270.
107
Id. at 271.
100

reiterated their stance that they “need not know how unequal the Tax is before concluding that it
unconstitutionally discriminates.”108
Thus, a state tax policy will be found to violate the Economic Protectionism standard, and
accordingly the Commerce Clause, when it “attempts to convey advantages on local merchants,”
or “give local consumers an advantage over consumers in other States.” 109 As indicated in
Maryland and Bacchus, a commercial advantage obtained through preferential tax treatment is
also deemed violative of the Commerce Clause, regardless of the means by which it is manifested
or of the intent of the tax or of the magnitude of the effect. 110 The Economic Protectionism
standard refrains from assessing such factors because economic protectionism is seen as the “very
evil that the dormant Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.”111 Thus, in its most extreme
application, the Economic Protectionism standard will find a state tax measure violative of the
Commerce Clause if it has the indirect effect of favoring local businesses regardless of the certainty
or magnitude of such effects.
III.

ANALYSIS.
Although the standards enunciated by case law regarding the anti-discrimination prong

have been applied to various tax policies, the constitutionality of BLTIs under the antidiscrimination prong of the Complete Auto test remains largely unanswered. 112

There are

conflicting decisions regarding whether tax incentive programs survive constitutional analysis.113
This Section of the Note will initially analyze BLTI policies under the standards enunciated under

Id. at 269 (holding, therefore, that the “small competitive threat” from the Hawaii excise tax was sufficient to
show protectionist effects.)
109
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1997).
110
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
111
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978).
112
Kaye, supra note 31, at 128.
113
Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 870.
108

the case law regarding the anti-discrimination prong. This Section will then analyze whether such
standards sufficiently encapsulate the entire concern behind the anti-discrimination prong. The
bulk of this Section will argue that although the standards are indeed insufficient in determining
whether the anti-discrimination clause has been violated, BLTIs are nonetheless unconstitutional
given other commonly used considerations. Lastly, this section will discuss why BLTIs have not
already been deemed unconstitutional.
BLTIs under the Anti-Discrimination Prong.
BLTI tax policies likely violate the Free Trade standard enunciated in Boston Stock
Exchange, meaning they likely have an effect of impermissibly obstructing free trade. 114 Under
the Free Trade standard, a tax measure will be found unconstitutional when it directs economic
activity from the most economically efficient channels.115 Arguably, BLTIs were created for this
exact purpose. BLTI policies were designed to attract and retain business activity through the
implementation of tax credits and the like, aimed at reducing the tax burden of participating
businesses.116 In a scenario where all relevant economic and business-oriented considerations
between two states are made equal, the location decision by the business-in-question would not
trend towards one state or the other. In fact, each state would have an equal chance at acquiring
the business, and its subsequent economic impact. If one state were to employ a BLTI, however,
the decision to locate made by the business will favor the State with the BLTI. This does not
necessarily mean that the economic activity is being directed away from the most economically
efficient channels, as both States had the potential to attract the State.
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However, in instances where the BLTI benefit to the business outweighs the economic
efficiency of locating within another state, the Free Trade standard will conclusively be violated. 117
Take for instance a scenario where in which one State (State A) has a small competitive
advantage—through its resources, workforce, etc.—that renders it the most economically efficient
state to run a business. For illustrative purposes, assume the efficiency benefit can be quantified
at 100 dollars.118 Thus, all things equal, the optimal location for the business to operate is in State
A and the business should choose this State to headquarter in. If, however, a competing State
(State B) implements a BLTI that reduces the tax obligation by 120 dollars, then the business will
likely operate within State B and experience an additional twenty-dollar reduction in overall
costs.119

In this situation, the business decision has been directed away from the most

economically efficient channels through tax regulation imposed by State B. Although the figures
were arbitrarily chosen, the principle stands the same: BLTIs were made to divert location
decisions from the most economically sensible states.120 Such a scenario violates the Free Trade
standard, and it is exactly because of that fact that BLTIs were inherently made to nurture such an
outcome that they cannot ever satisfy the Free Trade standard.
Furthermore, BLTI policies likely violate the Economic Protectionism standard enunciated
in Bacchus Imports.121 Under the Economic Protectionism standard, a taxing measure will violate
the anti-discrimination prong if it “operat[es] to the disadvantage of the products of other States
when introduced into the first mentioned State.”122 Unlike the Free Trade standard, however, this
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standard does not assess the comparative economic efficiency between states. Rather it determines
whether a regulatory measure discriminatorily benefits “in-state economic interests by burdening
out-of-state competitors.”123 The protectionist quality of the taxing measure can be shown through
either discriminatory purpose or effect. 124
With regards to BLTIs, they likely exhibit both a discriminatory purpose and effect. 125
Overall, BLTIs are created to stimulate the economic activity of the enacting State by attracting
business activity through tax reduction. 126 Although this may be a noble goal, it does not escape
the fact that states are in an unavoidable competition amongst themselves for attracting such
businesses.127 Therefore, to suggest that the entire purpose behind BLTI implementation is to
stimulate economic activity would be an incomplete assertion. Rather, a more accurate depiction
of the purpose behind BLTIs is to provide implementing States with a competitive edge over other
States in their acquisition of businesses. Thus, there is an inherently discriminatory purpose behind
BLTI policy implementation.
BLTIs also bring about discriminatory effects upon interstate commerce in two ways. First,
BLTIs have an effect similar to those found under legislation imposing “home-processing”
requirements.128 Home-processing requirements are forms of legislation that require in-state
businesses to utilize in-state processors, refiners, etc.129 Through such legislation, in-state
processors and the like now have exclusive access to such in-state businesses, effectively depriving
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out-of-state processors from such demand.130 They have been deemed largely unconstitutional
because they patently discriminate against out-of-state processors.131 In effect, however, BLTIs
are not much different than home-processing requirements. Although BLTIs do not operate in the
field of compulsions, they have the practical effect of assisting in-state businesses at the expense
of out-of-state businesses. Unless a business is completely vertically integrated, it must, at some
point, interact with other peripheral businesses to create its finished product. Such peripheral
businesses located in-state are given, at the very least, a geographical advantage over similar outof-state businesses.

This advantage—i.e., discriminatory effect—stems directly from the

implementation of the state BLTI policy.
BLTI policies also have the discriminatory effect of shielding in-state businesses from
larger tax liabilities that out-of-state business are susceptible to. This effect occurs after the
business, enticed by the BLTI, has located within the State that implements the BLTI. After
locating within the State, the business effectively becomes considered an in-state entity. As an instate entity, this business is now shielded from larger tax burdens that its out-of-state competitors
face because it receives BLTI tax credits. This lower tax burden reduces the expenses incurred by
the business, which provides it with a direct commercial advantage made solely through regulatory
policy.132
Thus, under the standards set forth by case law in analyzing whether a particular tax
measure unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce, BLTIs are likely to be
found unconstitutional.
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BLTIs v. Differential Sales Taxes.
Interestingly, under the anti-discrimination standards set forth above, certain sales taxes
would also be found unconstitutional as well. Sales taxes are taxes imposed by states and localities
that apply to the final sale of goods or services.133 Differential sales taxes are sales taxes that
incorporate a different sales tax rate than other states. Sales tax rates within the Unites States range
from 0.00% in States such as Alaska, Delaware, etc. to 11.5% in Puerto Rico. 134
When considering the discriminatory effect of differential sales taxes, 135 particularly those
that apply a lower sales tax rate, such taxing measures violate the two standards enunciated under
the anti-discrimination prong. For one, differential sales taxes potentially obstruct free trade in the
same way as BLTIs; they are regulatory measures that divert economic activity from the most
economically efficient channels when the lower sales tax outweighs reductions of costs through
efficiency.136

Further, differential sales taxes violate the Economic Protectionism standard

because they provide in-state entities with a direct commercial advantage over out-of-state
entities.137 In-state entities enjoy lower tax expenses that they can utilize to lower prices while
maintaining profit levels. Therefore, under both standards, differential sales taxes seem to violate
the Commerce Clause under the relevant case law. This is a problematic outcome because the
validity of sales taxes—even of differential sales taxes—is virtually unquestioned when the State
has a sufficient nexus with the transaction, and they are considered to be well within a State’s
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sovereignty to impose.138 On the likely premise that differential sales taxes are constitutional,
there must be some other consideration that may potentially validate BLTIs as well.
Virtually Per Se Rule of Invalidity.
One potential way to validate a differential sales tax is through its examination under the
virtually per se rule of invalidity. The virtually per se rule of invalidity is a potential, yet extremely
unlikely, means by which a discriminatory law can still be deemed constitutional under the
Commerce Clause. 139 In order for a discriminatory law to pass constitutional muster under the
virtually per se rule of invalidity, the law must promote a legitimate government interest and there
must be no non-discriminatory alternatives available to reach that interest. 140 This standard is an
exceedingly difficult standard to satisfy. 141 In many cases, Courts refrain in even partaking in the
often-futile analysis altogether. 142
BLTIs likely do not surmount the virtually per se rule of invalidity because they do not
promote a legitimate government interest.

It cannot be said that States have a legitimate

government interest in gaining a competitive advantage over other States in attracting business.
Such an interest would counter our constitutional principles of free and unified trade. 143 Assuming
arguendo that States can sufficiently argue that BLTI implementation furthers the State’s
legitimate government interest of stimulating the economy, BLTIs still do not pass constitutional
muster. This is the case because there exists other non-discriminatory alternatives also have the
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effect of stimulating economic activity. States can implement regulation that can strengthen
workforce capabilities, further develop their infrastructure, etc. These methods would have a
significant effect on stimulating economic activity within the State without treating in-state and
out-of-state entities differently.

Thus, BLTIs cannot surmount the virtually per se rule of

invalidity.
Differential sales taxes, however, are subject to a different fate than BLTIs under the
virtually per se rule of invalidity. Although the concept of sales tax imposition easily surmounts
this standard, the fact that States implement such taxes at varying levels presents difficult
questions. When analyzing sales taxes under the virtually per se rule of invalidity, states have a
legitimate government interest in generating revenue from the sale of goods or services. There is
also no other means by which to generate the revenue than to impose a tax. On the other hand,
with regards to differential sales taxes, though a legitimate government interest may be found,
there is no reason why the tax cannot incorporate the tax rate that avoids the discriminatory effect
incidental to differential sales taxes.

To simplify, the non-discriminatory alternative when

attempting to generate sales tax revenue would be to impose the same sales tax rate as everyone
else. However, because there is no ordinary sales tax rate—as different states impose different
rates—imposing the “same” sales tax rate is impossible. Thus, there are no non-discriminatory
alternatives available in imposing a sales tax at any rate, and the virtually per se rule of invalidity
is surmounted.
Pike Balancing Test: Whether the Burden Outweighs the Benefits
Although differential sales taxes likely survive analysis under the anti-discrimination prong
of the Dormant Commerce Clause under the virtually per se rule of invalidity, it is highly unlikely
that such taxing measures would be subject to such treatment. This is the case because differential

sales tax only present incidental effects on interstate commerce. 144 Yes, differential sales taxes
(particularly, those below the average sales tax rate) have the effect of discriminating against
interstate commerce, but the aim of these taxing measures cannot seriously be deemed to garner
local competitive advantage. On the other hand, BLTI tax policies do not have an incidental affect
on interstate commerce. BLTIs are deliberately designed to impact and affect interstate commerce
directly. Thus, although BLTIs will likely be analyzed under the virtually per se rule of invalidity,
differential sales taxes would be scrutinized under the more lenient Pike Balancing test.
The Pike Balancing test applies when “legislative objectives are credibly advanced [from
the State legislation] and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade.”145 This occurs
when “the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental.”146 Under the Pike Balancing test, state
legislation “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”147 The analysis of any particular legislation becomes,
therefore, a “question . . . of degree.”148 Under such an analysis, differential sales taxes easily
survive constitutional muster.149
On the other hand, even though analysis of BLTI policies under the Pike Balancing test
would be unlikely,150 BLTIs would still fail under this standard anyway. With regards to BLTIs,
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the burden on interstate commerce would result from the inefficiency in business activity
allocation. The benefit to the implementing State would result from the economic stimulation
from the business entity. In order to properly analyze whether the burden on interstate commerce
is outweighed by the putative local benefits of BLTI policy, a brief analysis on the economic
impact of BLTIs is vital.
Economic Impact of BLTIs.
By implementing BLTI policies, States have the ability to compete against one another to
entice businesses through regulatory tax measures—through policy that has nothing to do with the
business-attracting resources within the particular State. This form of competition leads to peculiar
economic consequences.
First, States find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma where they directly reduce taxable
income in a race-to-the-bottom fashion.151 States compete against one another for the limited
investment dollars of businesses within the United States. 152

When states compete by

implementing BLTIs, they effectively reduce their tax revenue by offering tax credits and the like
to businesses. The most competitive BLTI is the one which reduces the most taxes for businesses.
This directly reduces tax revenue for the State. In order to level the playing field, other States
must offer the same—lower—tax rate. The only means by which State competitors can garner
more attraction is through reducing the tax burden even further. Such a competitive scheme
effectively diminishes tax revenue simply in order to maintain competitive footing. States would
also refrain from increasing the tax obligation afterwards since their competitive position would
Enrich, supra note 46, at 468 (“In analyzing interstate bidding wars from a game theory perspective, Taylor
focuses on the supposed direct economic costs that a state may incur if it fails to match the incentives offered by
others. These economic costs may be illusory, however, if location incentives are largely ineffective, as the research
suggests. If these economic costs were the only relevant costs, then a state could escape the prisoners' dilemma by
simply declining to compete. The political costs of such a strategy, however, would likely be substantial, and these
political costs keep the states caught in the dilemma. In short, the states are political prisoners
152
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effectively vanish. The only means by which the tax rate could potentially return to its initial rate
would require a consensus of all the states. Given this unlikely consensus, 153 the competitors (i.e.,
the States) are unlikely to ever attain the previous, higher tax rate. In the long run, all of the
competitors are worse off.
Second, BLTIs do not upgrade business-oriented or business-attracting infrastructure. For
example, BLTIs create no meaningful impact on a State’s natural resource deposits (or rather the
State’s efficiency in acquiring such resources) or the educational levels of denizens within that
particular State. By offering the BLTI, the State’s hope rests upon the shoulders of the business
entity to stimulate and catalyze the economy instead. To secure this hope, States reduce taxable
revenue.
But herein lies the issue; businesses will only choose to enter into a state if the benefit from
the reduced tax burden outweighs the combined inefficiency in conducting business in the lessopportune location and the mandated costs of improving such infrastructure. Otherwise, the
business would choose to locate in the more efficient location in the first place.

BLTIs under the Pike Balancing Test.
When considering the economic impact of BLTI policies, BLTIs inherently fail the Pike
Balancing test. This is the case because businesses, at least those operating properly, only choose
to accept the BLTI offer when the inefficiency of operating within the State and the cost of meeting
BLTI requirements is outweighed by the potential tax reductions received under the BLTI
program. When considering the innocuous economic impact that BLTI policies have on State
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economies,154 the balance under the Pike Balancing Test tilts only against their constitutionality.
Thus, BLTIs likely fail constitutional inquiry under the Pike Balancing test.
Why BLTIs have not been defeated already.
Despite the apparent unconstitutionality of BLTIs, the Supreme Court of the United States
has not spoken on the constitutionality of BLTI policies.155 After the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that such tax incentive programs violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because
they impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 156
the issue of constitutionality of tax incentive programs was finally going to have its day in court. 157
However, in 2006, the Supreme Court dismissed the claim on the procedural issue of standing. 158
Thus, the prevalence of BLTI State policies throughout the United States, despite their likely
unconstitutionality, results from the inability to bring the issue in front of the Supreme Court. 159
IV.

CONCLUSION
Overall, BLTIs are likely unconstitutional because they violate the anti-discrimination

prong of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Regardless of the constitutional inquisition implemented
(the virtually per se rule of invalidity or the Pike Balancing test) the inherent nature of BLTIs to
garner a competitive advantage in the interstate marketplace renders them impermissibly
discriminatory. This renders BLTI policies patently unconstitutional no matter the circumstance.
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